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Abstract: After the dawn of the traditional, essentialist view of natural kinds in con-
temporary philosophy (exacerbated in philosophy of biology by “population think-
ing”), non-essentialist cluster conceptions of natural kinds have been extensively 
supported and applied to numerous biological categories. However, salient philoso-
phers have put forward two challenging arguments against cluster kind theories. I 
argue that, in both cases, discontent with a cluster conception of natural kinds is 
motivated by tacit and previous assumptions that can be challenged. I conclude that 
the concerns expressed in the objections do not make good reasons to resist natural 
kinds talk in biology unless one is willing to share such commitments and assump-
tions with respect to natural kinds. Ultimately, the discussion can be used to point 
out that our very expectations regarding natural kinds theories could use a rethink. 
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1. Introduction
According to a traditional conception in contemporary philosophy, natural kinds are defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, which 
constitute the kind’s essence (Putnam 1973; Kripke 1980). Essential properties 
are intrinsic features, typically, to be found in a thing’s micro-structure. Such 
properties are possessed by all and only the members of the kind, and they 
must explain why members share other superficial features. For the most 
interesting scientific cases, such a definition was hard to achieve, and this 
traditional conception received extensive criticism (see Bird and Tobin 2015). 
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In the philosophy of biology, the most widely discussed case of a natural 
kind is that of biological species (Boyd 1999; Griffiths 1999; Millikan 
1999; Wilson et al. 2007). However, many authors concerned with species 
turned against the traditional conception of natural kinds. It was argued that 
an essentialist conception of species is precluded by or incompatible with the 
“population thinking” that characterizes modern Darwinian biology (Sober 
1980). Mayr argued that the Darwinian theory involves the replacement of an 
entire mode of thinking in biology, namely essentialism, with an opposite one, 
namely, population thinking. In his own words:
the populationist stresses the uniqueness of everything in the organic world […]. 
All organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique features and can 
be described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, or any kind of 
organic entities, form populations of which we can determine the arithmetic mean 
and the statistics of variation. Averages are merely statistical abstractions, only the 
individuals of which the population are composed have reality (Mayr 1976, 28-9)
 
The typologist (as Mayr calls it) would regard variation as an illusion, 
whereas the populationist would take the type to be an abstraction and take 
variation to be real. From the populationist perspective, then, any essentialist 
view of natural kinds would be unsuited for biological kinds.
A different conception of natural kinds —one that has been extensively 
applied in biology— is found in Richard Boyd’s seminal work. According 
to his Homeostatic Property Clusters theory (HPC, hereafter) kinds are not 
definable in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, but in terms 
of a cluster of shared properties and a set of mechanisms responsible for such 
clustering, both of which are conceived in an open-ended manner. Cluster 
views of natural kinds have been further developed over the years and they seem 
to be better prepared to account for classification practices in biology (e.g., 
to account for species and higher taxa, cell types, homologies, developmental 
modules, genes, life, or ecosystems).
Nonetheless, and despite the general acknowledgement of the merits 
of cluster views, compared to a traditional, essentialist conception, some 
philosophers believe that cluster views are too weak or flexible. More specifically, 
there are two important objections that, surprisingly, have not been properly 
analyzed and contested: (a) the explanatory limitation objection and (b) the 
membership determination objection. My aim in this paper is to dismantle these 
objections from a naturalistic, anti-essentialist point of view.
I will argue that in both cases, discontent with a cluster conception of 
natural kinds is motivated by tacit and previous assumptions with respect 
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to natural kinds, which involve the aim of a theory of natural kinds and 
expectations regarding scientific classification systems. I will challenge these 
assumptions, showing how they are unwarranted, and conclude that the 
concerns expressed in the objections do not make good reasons to resist 
natural kinds talk in biology unless one is willing to positively endorse such 
commitments. My considerations do not rely on peculiarities of any particular 
biological kind (species or higher taxa, cell types, genes, etc.), but on more 
general ideas about natural kinds and classifications. Importantly, I will not 
argue here that there are genuine natural kinds (biological or otherwise). This 
paper will not contribute to defend natural kind realism. Rather, I aim at 
undermining two ways of resisting natural kind talk in biology, namely, on the 
basis of these two objections.
 
2. Natural Kinds in Contemporary Philosophy:  
Micro-essentialism and Property Clusters Kinds
The topic of natural kinds is one of the most classic topics in metaphysics 
and philosophy of science. It is a common belief that objects in nature can be 
classified into different kinds of things, on the one hand, and that natural 
scientific theories and disciplines talk about these kinds, on the other. Stances 
on the naturalness of kinds (are there genuine divisions in nature?) range 
from realism to conventionalism. A realist believes that genuine divisions 
exist independently of human practices, even if we reflect them incorrectly. 
In contrast, a conventionalist stands for the idea that all kinds are epistemic 
construals that reflect our needs and interests (be daily or scientific), with no 
existence of their own. 
The traditional realist conception of natural kinds in contemporary 
philosophy is mainly due to Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1973; 
1975). According to their view, natural kinds are defined by a conjunction 
of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, which constitute 
the kind’s essence. Essential properties are intrinsic features, typically, to be 
found in the thing’s micro-structure. Such properties are possessed by all 
and only the members of the kind, and they must explain why members 
share other superficial features. Essential properties also explain one of the 
most salient features of natural kind categories in the traditional view: their 
projectibility. Traditionally, natural kinds are categories used in explanation 
and prediction (sometimes expressed in the requirement that they must feature 
in scientific laws). A well-known example discussed by Kripke is gold. Having 
the atomic number 79 is an essential property of gold, which explains its 
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other microchemical or phenomenic properties. Something similar to gold in 
superficial respects (color, for example) but which lacks the property of having 
the atomic number 79, would not be gold. Putnam argues for similar micro-
essentialistic intuitions regarding natural kinds with his famous Twin Earth 
thought experiment (Putnam 1973; 1975).
Philosophers of the special sciences soon began to criticize the traditional 
view of natural kinds (for a review of the different criticisms, see Bird and Tobin 
2015). For the most interesting scientific cases, a definition in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions was hard to achieve, and micro-structuralism, as the 
thesis that kinds can be individuated solely in terms of their microstructural 
properties, was also put into question. Chemical species and substances and 
biological species were essentialist philosophers’ preferred examples for a long 
time. Yet, philosophers of chemistry have argued that chemical species and 
substances are not correctly captured by the essentialist view of natural kinds 
(Needham 2000; 2011; van Brakel 2005; Ruthenberg 2012). Quite the 
same happened in the philosophy of biology. Several authors concerned with 
biological species also turned against the traditional view and argued that an 
essentialist conception of species is precluded by the “population thinking” that 
characterizes modern evolutionary biology. The upshot seemed to be that any 
essentialist view of natural kinds was going to be unsuited for biological kinds 
(Mayr 1966; 1976; see also Sober 1980). Objections against the traditional 
essentialist view of natural kinds were not only motivated by a general rejection 
of natural kind talk in biology altogether (such as the view that species are 
spatio-temporally extended individuals rather than kinds, cf. Ghiselin 1974 
and Hull 1978). Rather, this traditional conception was contested even by 
advocates of the natural kindhood of biological species (cf. references below).
A different realist view of natural kinds was put forward by Richard Boyd 
(1991; 1999) and further developed by others (for example Millikan 1999; 
Griffiths 1999; Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007; Slater 2015), this is, 
the homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC, hereafter). This view of natural 
kinds shares an important characteristic with the traditional one, apart from 
the realist stance. From the point of view of their role in scientific practice, 
HPC-kinds and traditional kinds stand on an equal footing. However, there 
are important ways in which HPC theory introduces novel ways of thinking 
about natural kinds. First, in HPC theory, similarity is nonperfect. Members 
of a HPC-kind do share some properties, but there is no property or set of 
properties that can be said to be necessary and sufficient for kind membership. 
The cluster of properties is conceived in an open-ended manner. Thus, HPC-
kinds are not definable in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
as in the Kripke/Putnam view.
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But members of a natural kind in the HPC sense are not just imperfectly 
similar entities. If this was the case, the inductive power of natural kinds 
would be something of a miracle. HPC-kinds are projectible categories in 
virtue of sharing homeostatic mechanisms. These mechanisms are causally 
responsible for the co-occurrence (clustering) of properties and grant their 
non-accidentality: entities are not similar just because; they are similar by virtue 
of common mechanisms that tend to maintain certain properties together, or 
because the instantiation of some properties favor the instantiation of others. 
In sum, HPC-kinds are defined and individuated by (i) the property cluster 
and (ii) the set of underlying homeostatic mechanisms responsible for the 
former.
Another salient feature of HPC theory is that it is compatible with change. 
Both the property cluster and the set of underlying homeostatic mechanisms 
may change along with changes in environmental contexts, so HPC-kinds are 
not immutable. Such a tolerance to change opens up the possibility of kinds 
with vague boundaries, which makes the theory especially attractive to account 
for the changing nature of biological phenomena. 
There is a widespread understanding that HPC theory (or other 
philosophical views with the main characteristics of HPC) is better prepared 
to deal with classification practices in biological sciences, as shown by the 
multiple applications of it in the philosophy of biology literature. Apart from 
species (Boyd 1988; 1989; 1991; 1999a; 1999b; Keller, Boyd & Wheeler 
2003; Wilson 2005; Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007), other biological 
categories argued to constitute cluster kinds include higher taxa (Rieppel 
2005b), cell types (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007; Slater 2013), 
ecosystems (Slater 2018), life (Diéguez 2013; Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez 
2018), homologies (Rieppel 2005a; Brigandt 2002), developmental modules 
(Rieppel 2005a), and genes (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007). Yet some 
philosophers have criticized HPC (and/or related views). In the next section, 
I will consider two objections against cluster kinds and suggest how they can 
be countered.
 
3. How Not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology
The merits of the cluster notions are generally acknowledged, but for 
some there is a high price to pay for such merits. Here, I will address two 
objections: explanatory limitation and membership determination. Countering 
these objections shows at least two ways in which one should not resist the 
natural kind talk in biology. 
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3.1 The Explanatory Limitation Objection
In analyzing different conceptualizations of life, Mark Bedau (2014; 
2007) recognizes that a property-cluster approach to living systems neatly 
explains the existence of borderline cases and why life comes in degrees, 
difficulties faced by those attempting to define life. However, he also states 
that cluster views are unsatisfying insofar as they fall short of some explanatory 
potential that they should bear. Bedau finds the “weakness” of the cluster 
approaches in the fact that “explanations end too quickly”. He writes: 
The view does not explain why certain properties in the cluster are 
significant and other properties are not (…). The cluster conception cannot 
explain why life is characterized by one cluster of properties rather than another. 
The dimensions of the cluster of properties associated with living organisms is 
simply accepted as a contingent empirical fact. Those who expect some further 
explanation for life’s characteristic properties will find the cluster conception of 
life unsatisfying (Bedau 2014, 18, emphasis added)
The objection sounds seriously challenging at first glance, but I want to 
show that it conflates two different questions and misses the important one. I 
suggest that the question “Why is a kind characterized by certain properties 
rather than by others?”, while extremely important to other contexts, is not 
relevant for evaluating the success or failure of natural kind theories, either 
essentialistic or otherwise. For an essentialist, since a kind is characterized by 
its essential properties, and once we’ve found the essence of a kind, it makes 
little sense to ask further “why is this rather than that the essence of this kind?” 
By definition, it could not have been differently (otherwise, this would not 
really count as an essence). Or, perhaps worse, the only possible answer would 
be circular: “because that’s its essence”. From the anti-essentialist perspective, 
the fact that a kind is characterized by certain properties rather than by others 
(which could be rephrased as the fact that one cluster of properties is maintained 
by certain homeostatic mechanisms rather than another), while not a matter of 
definition, could only be regarded either as a brute fact of the universe or as 
a matter of divine intention. This might sound uncomfortably problematic, 
but we do seem to accept this type of situation. For example, we would rarely 
question why the speed of light is 299,792,458 meters per second rather than 
a different one (Lange 2002, ch. 4.3). So, it might be the case that a cluster 
approach cannot offer an answer to this type of questions, but neither can other 
types of theories, and this is probably unachievable. Bedau’s question shouldn’t 
be used to evaluate natural kind theories because if it were, no theory would 
pass the test. This is a situation that could lead us to reject essentialistic and 
anti-essentialistic views of natural kinds altogether, or could point to something 
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else. In fact, we might as well wonder whether this was the pertinent question 
—again, from the point of view of a philosophical theory of natural kinds—.
I contend that the crucial question from the point of view of the 
philosophical problem of natural kinds, and how are natural kind theories 
evaluated, is how we distinguish natural kinds from non-natural kinds. Whereas 
natural kind theories do not aim at answering Bedau’s question, they do offer 
criteria to answer this one. It is interesting to notice how can both be easily 
conflated under an essentialist viewpoint: natural kinds are distinguished from 
non-natural kinds because objects belonging to a given natural kind share 
essential properties, and those are precisely the properties that characterize the 
kind. But what is even more interesting is that both questions seem to collapse 
in Bedau’s objection too. Recall he suggests that the cluster approach is flawed 
because it fails to answer the question as to why a kind is characterized by 
certain properties rather than by others. If we agree that the key question a 
theory of natural kinds must pursue is that of how to distinguish natural kinds 
from non-natural kinds, then, one would also see that his expectation that 
a cluster approach to natural kinds should, in order to succeed as such (i.e., 
in order to be able to account for the second), also answer the first question, 
entails a conflation of the two questions1.
Of course, I do not mean to deny that there must be an explanation 
for the fact that, among the multiple properties that characterize living 
things, some are more common than others. Rather, my point is that this 
question cannot be properly addressed from the philosophical point of view 
of identifying natural kinds, where the problem is how to distinguish natural 
classifications from non-natural ones. In fact, the first question is independent 
of this latter issue and calls for biological theories, models, generalizations, and 
hypotheses (Sober 1992, 763). If we could expect the kind concept of living 
systems to answer questions such as “why do most living things reproduce?”, 
or “why do replicating entities usually undergo evolution?” by itself, then what 
should we need biological science for? Biology must explain the occurrence 
and co-occurrence of properties of living things, but this is too much to ask of 
a natural kind concept. 
3.2 The Membership Determination Objection
The second objection I consider here has to do not with the explanatory 
scope of cluster theories when already facing a classification (this is, provided 
the sorting has been done), but with the sorting itself. More specifically, it 
1 Not in the sense of the failure to distinguish them as distinct questions, but to pick out that 
which expresses the aim of a NK theory.
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states that HPC theory (and, likely, any other cluster view) fails to offer solid 
criteria to fix kind membership. This is due to the fact that both the property 
family and the underlying homeostatic mechanisms are defined in an open-
ended manner, so that both may in principle change (Reydon 2009). Thomas 
Reydon claims that “HPC theory, then, can only account for kinds whose 
extensions have already been fixed independently by other means” (2009, 729). 
First, Boyd was not unaware of this, and he rather acknowledged that 
determining membership can be difficult in some cases. However, he didn’t 
see this “necessary indeterminacy”, as he called it (see Boyd 1991, 141-2), as 
a serious problem for his HPC theory. Other cluster views do not take this to 
be a problem either (see Slater 2015). Then, from what point of view is this 
really a problem?
It will certainly be a serious difficulty for those who believe that a 
theory of natural kinds must fundamentally provide us with criteria to fix 
membership, an idea that might betray essentialistic hidden assumptions. 
From an essentialist point of view, fixing membership is a very simple thing to 
do in principle: one only needs to find out whether the item instantiates the 
kind’s essence, provided that said essence has been identified. Shortly, for any 
given object x, a given kind K and an essence E of K, xϵK ↔Ex. Faced with the 
challenge of identifying essences in the first place, determining membership 
for a given object is arguably the lesser problem. Nonetheless, the very demand 
that a theory of natural kinds alone provides with infallible membership 
determination criteria might be itself an essentialist requirement, as essences 
are meant to play precisely this role. 
It might be true that cluster approaches rely on some independent 
criteria for membership determination, which are far from agreed-upon for 
the most part in biological classifications. However, the question is, again: is 
this a reasonable expectation for natural kind theories? Aren’t we assuming 
(even if implicitly) the requirements self-imposed by an essentialist view of 
natural kinds? From an anti-essentialist point of view, the argument against 
cluster kind theories cannot be that these fail to offer reliable criteria to 
determine membership themselves, as this would amount to claiming that 
non-essentialistic approaches to natural kinds fail for not being essentialistic! 
And this wouldn’t be fair. 
I believe that there are two unwarranted assumptions behind this second 
objection. First, that no classification system can be said to be natural if it fails 
to classify things in a “black or white”, unambiguous, and definitive manner, 
insofar as this seems to be a consequence of adopting a cluster approach. And 
we lack a non-essentialistic argument to support this assumption. Secondly, 
that any approach to natural kinds that does not enclose or entail membership 
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determination criteria by itself will fail to be a proper theory of natural kinds. 
Cluster approaches in fact do not set out to provide an algorithmic procedure 
to determine membership, because they refuse to foreground one or a few 
properties as essential to biological classifications. Rather, they aim at providing 
a general framework for identifying natural kinds as opposed to arbitrary or 
mind-dependent groups of things. I see no reason to believe that determining 
membership in a clear-cut, “yes or no” manner is a requisite to achieving the 
former goal and therefore, no reason to believe that both things are to be found 
in a theory of natural kinds. Rather, I contend that the aim of any theory of 
natural kinds is not so much to be able to fix membership, but to be able 
to distinguish natural kinds from non-natural kinds in the first place. If the 
greatest aim of a theory of natural kinds (and the minimum we must expect it 
to provide for) is rather some criteria with which one can distinguish natural 
kinds from arbitrary groupings of things, and if cluster theories convincingly 
achieve this goal, then we need not insist on the membership determination 
worry. Besides, determining membership is to a great extent a scientific task 
and should not be left for philosophy alone to settle.
4. Final Remarks
The natural kind talk in biology (and elsewhere) can be resisted from very 
different points of view. For example, it can be resisted from the more general 
scientific anti-realism. If science, generally, is not in the business of pursuing 
truth (or approximations to it), it is not in the business of pursuing natural 
classification systems in particular, either. Yet someone endorsing such a stance 
would not bother discussing the peculiarities and details of cluster views of 
natural kind (being these realistic in character). Perhaps more interesting and 
challenging, if one has at least minimal realistic intuitions, are those objections 
that do not stem from a generalized rejection of natural kinds, such as the ones 
I have addressed here. The objections examined in section 3 are only relevant 
if one is not previously committed to the view that a natural kind theory must 
offer empirical explanations, or to essentialism, or to a generalized anti-realism 
regarding scientific classifications. It is for those who are not endorsing such 
stances that I have tried to dismantle the membership determination objection 
and the explanatory limitation objection. But if this is not the case, then this is 
not the appropriate way to resist the natural kind talk in biology —and cluster 
theories of natural kinds should be argued against in a different way—. 
By no means are the arguments herein meant to support a generalized 
cluster view of natural kinds. In fact, it does not follow from my discussion 
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of the two objections that a cluster approach to natural kinds is the right way 
to go. It can still be the case that cluster theories face other, more compelling 
issues that the alleged pitfalls we have examined. Rather than defending cluster 
views per se, my aim was to undermine particular objections raised against 
them and argue that if cluster theories can be resisted, it is not on the grounds 
of such objections. 
The ultimate moral to be drawn from the analysis of the objections 
minds our very expectations from philosophical theories of natural kinds: what 
is it that such a philosophical theory must provide? And this question needs to 
be properly contextualized, this is, by reference to more general philosophical 
stances (as scientific essentialism, scientific naturalism, or scientific anti-
realism). From an anti-essentialist point of view, rather than considering that 
the “permissiveness” of cluster approaches must be deemed unacceptable, we 
might as well revise our own expectations regarding natural kinds.
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